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THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN
OWNERSHIP OF AUTOMOBILE AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF PERSON OPERATING IT
Generally speaking, absent statutory change, an owner of an automobile is
responsible for injuries resulting from its negligent operation by another, only if it is
shown that, at the time of the injury, the relationship of principal and agent or master
and servant existed between the owner and the operator, and that the operator was
then acting in the scope of his employment.
Ordinary human experience and knowledge show clearly that in the great ma-
jority of cases automobiles are operated by their owners or by some servant or agent
on the owner's business. It is equally apparent that in the cases where this is false,
the knowledge of the facts and the ability to show them are peculiarly in the cog-
nizance of the owner. Understanding this, the great majority of the courts of the
United States recognixe that it is desirable and fair to aid the plaintiff in establishing
his case by giving him the assistance of some sort of a presumption of the agency
of the driver and that he was in the scope of his employment-either from ownership
of the automobile alone, or from ownership plus some other related fact.,
In Missouri the nature of this so-called presumption is not clear. For the
point under discussion, however, it suffices to'say that the plaintiff, by introducing
certain facts, the nature of which will be discussed, may get to the jury without
bringing forth certain of the positive evidence usually necessary to establish the
defendant's liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The rule, as generally stated, is that where the plaintiff introduces proof that
the defendant owned the automobile causing the injury, a presumption arises that
the operator of the machine was the defendant's servant, and was then acting within
the scope of his employment. This rule is followed by a majority of the courts in the
United States.2
The Missouri courts have always followed this rule where the motor car involved
in the injury was a commercial vehicle belonging to the defendant. 3 However, origi-
nally, a different rule was applied where the injury was caused by a pleasure auto-
mobile., The Missouri rule as to pleasure cars was the same as the minority rule as to
both types of vehicles. That is, where the plaintiff introduced proof that the defend-
ant owned the car, and that the driver was his agent or servant, a presumption arose
that the driver was acting in the scope of his employment. The leading Missouri
case supporting this rule in the case of pleasure automobiles was Hays v. Hogan,5
in which the court stated that a presumption must be based upon a fact-that it
would not presume from the defendant's ownership that the car was being driven
by his agent, and from that presumption presume that the driver was acting in the
scope of his employment. In other words, such a presumption was held to violate
the oft-quoted rule that "a presumption cannot be based upon a presumption."
This difference in the rules persisted in Missouri until 1928 when in Edwards v.
Rubin' it was held that mere proof of ownership of the automobile in the defendant,
whether the car was a pleasure or commercial vehicle, was sufficient to take the
plaintiff to the jury.. This case cited as authority for the proposition laid down:
1. 42 A. L. R. 898; continued in 74 A. L. R. 951. App. 1925); but cf. Byrnes v. Poplar Bluff Printing
2. Supra note 1. Co., 74 S. W. (2d) 20 (Mo. Sup. 1934).
3. Fleischman v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co.. 148 4. Long v. Nute, 123 Mo. App. 204, 1OOS. W. 511
Mo. App. 117, 127 S. W. 660 (1910); O'Malley v. (1907); Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215, 198 S. W.
Heman Construction Co., 255 Mo. 386 164 S. W. 565 854 (1917); Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S. W. 286
(1914); Mann v. Stewart Sand Co., 211 Mo. App. 256, (1917).
243 S. W. 406 (1922); Barz v. Fleischmann Yeast 5. Supra note 4.
Co., 308 Mo. 288, 271 S. W. 361 (1925); Spellmeyer 6. 221 Mo. App. 246, 2 S. W. (2d) 205 (1928).
v. Theodore Hiertz Metal Co., 272 S. W. 1068 (Mo.
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Linton v. St. Louis Lightning Rod Co.7, Ford v. Ford Roofing Products Co.', Beeson v.
Fleming,9 and State ex rel Smith v. Trimble," none of which bear particularly on the
point in issue. It further cited Snyder v. Western Union Telegraph Co.", Jacobson v.
Beffa, 12 Barz v. Fleischmann Yeast Co., and Spellmeyer v. Hiertz Metal Co. 14 The
Telegraph Company case held only that proof of the driver's employment by the
defendant raised a presumption that he was acting in the scope of his employment.
The Jacobson case held that a prima facie case was established when proof was
introduced that defendant owned the car and was in it at the time of the accident.
This involves the doctrine applicable where the owner is present in his car driven
by another, and thus seems to have no bearing on the presumption under considera-
tion. The two cases last cited both involved commercial vehicles, and so, under the
rules in effect at that time, should hardly have been used as authority in a case
involving a pleasure car. At any rate, the case, though weak, changed the Missouri
law, and a line of Missouri Appeals cases following Edwards v. Rubin"5 sprang up.',
The rule then persisted unquestioned until the recent case of Kurz v. Greenl ase
Motor Co.17 In this case, the plaintiff was injured by a sedan belonging to the de-
fendant automobile sales agency. The proof negatived any principal-agent relation-
ship between defendant and the driver, but, as dictum, the court said that ". . . the
mere admitted ownership of the Peerless sedan is not sufficient to supply the neces-
sary proof of agency or that the alleged agent was engaged in the work of his sup-
posed master." As authority for this proposition, the court cited State ex rel. Vesper
Buick Motor Co. v. Daues.18 The Supreme Court of Missouri in this case merely
held that a ruling by an appellate court, that proof of ownership plus proof of the
driver's employment by the defendant was sufficient to take plaintiff's case to the
jury, was not inconsistent with prior decisions by the Missouri Supreme Court.
The court cited with equal approval the rules laid down in Guthrie v. Holmes" and
in O'Malley v. Heman Construction Co.,"0 both of which were decided prior to Ed-
wards v. Rubin.,' The Guthrie case involved a pleasure car and set forth the original
pleasure car rule which required proof of ownership plus proof that the driver was the
defendant's agent; the O'Malley case concerned a pleasure vehicle and laid down that
rule-that mere proof of ownership was sufficient to take the plaintiff to the jury.
From the citing of the two rules, it is at least thinkable that the court in the Daues
case evidenced a tendency toward a return to the old "split" rule in effect prior to
Edwards v. Rubin.22 At best, however, it is apparent that the Daues case can be
considered as only very weak inferential dictum in support of the holding in Kurz V.
Greenlease Motor Co. 21
The Kurz case was then taken to the Supreme Court of Missouri on certiorari24
to the judges of the appellate court, the plaintiff seeking to quash the record on the
ground that this decision of the Court of Appeals was in conflict with controlling
Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court pointed out that "the decision of the
7. 285 S. W. 183 (Mo. App. 1927). 793 (Mo. App. 1930); Benson v. Smith, 38 S. W. (2d)
8. 285 S. W. 538 (Mo. App. 1927). 743 (Mo. App. 1931).
9. 315 Mo. 177, 285 S. W. 708 (1927). 17. 52 S. W. (2d) 498 (Mo. App. 1932).
10. 315 Mo. 166, 285 S. W. 729 (1927). 18. 323 Mo, 388, 19 S. W. (2d) 700 (1929).
11. 277 S. W. 362 (Mo. App. 1925). 19. Supra note 4.
12. 282 S. W. 161 (Mo. App. 1926). 20. Supra note 3.
13. Supra note 3. 21. Supra note 6.
14. Supra note 3. 22. Supra note 6.
15. Supra note 6. 23. Supra note 17.
16. McCarter v. Burger, 6 S. W. (2d) 979 (Mo. 24. State ex rel Kurz v. Bland, 64 S. W. (2d) 638
App. 1928); Murphy v. Tumbrink, 25 S. W. (2d) 133 (Mo. Sup. 1933).
(Mo. App. 1930); Hampe v. Versen, 32 S. W. (2d)
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Court of Appeals... does not, as relator seems to be of the impression it does, involve
the question of the sufficiency of plaintiff's primafacie case to surmount the demurrer
* . . and it is not upon the state of the record at that juncture of the case that the
respondents predicated their opinion; but the case was, on appeal, determined
upon the question of the substantiality of the plaintiff's prima facie case as finally
submitted to the jury upon the facts in this record." The court then went on and
upheld the decision of the Appellate Court, repeating that mere proof of ownership
of the automobile was insufficient to take plaintiff to the jury. It seems apparent
that the Supreme Court was of.the opinion that the plaintiff, in his certiorari, had
totally misconstrued the reason for the Appellate Court's determination of the case
in the defendant's favor. This being true, it seems equally clear that the Supreme
Court's holding on the precise point involved on the plaintiff's writ of certiorari
was merely dictum, and as such, should not be used as the basis of a jurisdiction to
review not otherwise existing in applications for certiorari on the same point.
When it is noted that the Appellate Court's holding in the Kurz case was dictum,
and that the Supreme Court's approval of this dictum was also dictum, it seems
obvious that the Kurz case is very weak authority for a return to the original pleasure
car rule. Nevertheless, the case throws doubt on the probable future rules in Mis-
souri. Should the dictum be followed, Missouri would again return to the "split"
rule. Probably, although the language was broad enough to include commercial
vehicles, the dictum was not intended to refer to them.
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